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ABSTRACT: The III European Liberal Arts and Core Texts Education Conference, 
held at the University of Navarra on October 17-19th, 2019 addressed question such as 
whether core text education can train the virtues and, in this way, promote intellectual 
development and personal growth, resulting in students who are engaged with, and care 












Recent debates on higher education are focusing on interdisciplinarity and problem-
solving skills, but tend to forget the classic goals of a liberal education, namely, 
personal growth and the engagement with the fundamental questions of being human. 
The reading of core texts – i.e. classic texts from philosophical, historical, literary, 
cultural, or scientific traditions involving ‘the best that has been written’ – eminently 
allows for a reflection on the great questions of human existence. They allow the 
student to develop certain intellectual dispositions or character traits whereby the 
student gains agency in navigating the different knowledge areas within the realm of the 
university and life outside it. 
One could argue that core text education does so because it shapes the student as 
human being and facilitates the development of certain moral and intellectual 
dispositions or virtues. For example, reading a core text invites a sense of wonder and 
the capacity to amaze oneself; it requires charity to make sense of certain assumptions, 
expectations and a world view in a core text that may initially seem foreign; it 
presupposes courage to be open-minded and to withhold judgment, and core texts 
inherently train a kind of intellectual discipline as they tend to be demanding, requiring 
a significant dose of tenacity, depth, and reflection. Furthermore, core texts can be said 
to promote self-knowledge when they act as a mirror to one’s own dispositions and 
deeply held beliefs. As students immerse themselves in a core text they inherently 
become at home in it and, returning to their own world from what is other they are 
(trans)formed in their view of the world. As students change, they change the world 
around them. 
The training of these virtues may be reflected not only in the relationship between 
the reader and the text but also between the readers – students and teachers – in the 
classroom. Here, core texts discussions train the virtues of charity in allowing one 
another to speak freely, the courage in opening up about one’s own dearly held beliefs, 
and the open-mindedness in withholding judgment of the opinions of one’s peers. As 
such, core texts can create an intellectual community and even friendship, despite real 
and important differences. 
Since all these questions have practical implications for the students’ (and teachers’) 
lives, they cannot be restricted to the classroom. It should be encouraged to look for 
answers in experience and life. The kind of community that liberal arts colleges and 
universities create offers an ideal setting for this. In a community, virtues can be learned 
and exercised. Properly speaking, virtues cannot be taught, but teachers and other 
students can act as midwives, both intellectually (through conversations in and outside 
the classroom) and practically (through their example and interaction). 
Can core text education train the virtues and, in this way, promote intellectual 
development and personal growth, resulting in students who are engaged with, and care 
for, the world? And, if so, how, and which virtues? Which virtues or vices are discussed 
in particular core texts? How does core text education promote community? 
These were the questions addressed at the III European Liberal Arts and Core Texts 
Education Conference, held at the University of Navarra on October 17-19th, 2019. 
Three of the papers presented at the conference are included in this Core Curriculum 
Document. They deal with authors as distant in time and space as Socrates, Dorothy 
Sayers or Isocrates, but they have in common the capacity to shed light on the education 
of the new generations.
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In Plato's four-dialogue sequence of the Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, and Phaedo, 
Socrates’ words and deeds in the final few weeks of his life give witness to many truths 
about the moral life. The four dialogues record Socrates’ words and deeds pretrial, 
during trial, in prison, and at his execution, and they show a person who, facing the end 
of life, lives out his final weeks, days, and hours with strength and moral rectitude. 
Socrates seems to be offered by Plato as a friendly guide to how one ought to live 
uprightly.  
Socrates' moral guidance can be distilled into various truths and principles. The 
challenge to carry out the distillation of the moral insights in the four dialogues is a 
good exercise to assign undergraduates as they hone critical reading and reasoning skills 
and learn to think deeply about enduring questions such as “what is morality?” and 
“how should I live my life?” Some of what emerges from the four dialogues is 
straightforward (and maybe even obvious). Other things are less clear and require 
greater effort to extract. Here are ten moral insights that emerge. While not exhaustive, 
these ten capture many of Socrates’ most important moral insights. 
First, Socrates regards at least many moral matters as both objective and knowable 
by reason. Morality, or at least important parts of it, is neither relative nor a matter of 
individual subjectivity, and skepticism is not the appropriate attitude toward moral 
knowledge. This might be called the principle of objectivity and intelligibility. For 
example, in the Euthyphro Socrates and Euthyphro agree that, whatever piety and 
impiety are, persons or gods do not decide the matter. Instead, piety is what it is, and 
people and the gods respond to the objective reality of it. To reach agreement on this 
point is why Socrates asks: “Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it 
pious because it is loved by the gods?”3 With this question Socrates is attempting to 
elicit from Euthyphro the response, “the former.” The Euthyphro is the search for the 
objective reality or real quality or form that makes all pious actions pious. So also, 
however often Socrates might insist that he is ignorant of the nature of piety, readers 
know better. Socrates clearly makes progress in the understanding of piety and impiety: 
piety is indeed a part of justice which involves people’s relation to superiors such as the 
 
1 A short version of part of this paper was presented at the III European Liberal Arts and Core Texts 
Education Conference: Caring for Souls – Can Core Texts Educate Character? University of Navarra, 
Pamplona, October, 2019, and a short version of a different part of this paper was presented at the 
Association for Core Texts and Courses Twenty-Fifth Annual Conference, Santa Fe, NM, April 2019. 
The whole paper is inspired by a wonderful lecture delivered once upon a time by my long-time colleague 
at Saint Anselm College, James O'Rourke. His lecture was titled: “Acting on Principle: Socrates' Moral 
Absolutism.” 
2 Professor Philosophy Department, Saint Anselm College (Manchester, NH), USA. Email: 
randerso@anselm.edu 
3 Euthyphro, 10a. 
SOCRATES' MORAL INSIGHT AND EXAMPLE  
IN THE EUTHYPHRO, APOLOGY, CRITO, AND PHAEDO1 
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gods.4 Again, in the Crito whether escape from prison would be right or wrong is not 
for Socrates or Crito or anybody else to decide. Instead, the moral character of escape is 
what it is, and people are obligated to discover what it is and then to align their actions 
with its objective reality. In the Crito, accordingly, Socrates examines the question of 
escape and is convinced that he has figured out the right answer to the question. The 
detached point of view that marks objectivity is expressed in Socrates final words of the 
dialogue: “Let it be then, Crito, and let us act in this way, since this is the way the god is 
leading us.”5 
Second and third, two more principles evident in the Crito are closely connected to 
the idea that moral matters are both objective and accessible to reason. The first is the 
principle of expertise. In many Platonic dialogues, Socrates argues that if a person 
wants to learn how something is done or what is true, then the person should seek out 
those who are knowledgeable. The opinions of the ignorant, confused, or stupid are 
worthless. Collections of such opinions in surveys are equally worthless. Thus, answers 
to the perennial questions that human beings have should be sought from the 
knowledgeable, those with expertise, or the wise and from nobody else. Socrates' search 
for the wise is behind his questions to Crito: “Why should we care so much for what the 
majority think?”6 and “Do you think it is a sound statement that one must not value all 
opinions of men, but some and not others, nor the opinions of all men, but those of 
some and not of others?”7 Socrates' life-long search for the wise in Athens led, as 
Socrates explains in the Apology, to a dead end.8 Second, Socrates measures success in 
penetrating the truth of a given matter by the principle of rational persuasion. The 
stronger argument should prevail in disputes. The weight Socrates gives to rational 
argument is captured well in:  
We must therefore examine whether we should act in this way or not, as not only now but 
at all times I am the kind of man who listens only to the argument that on reflection 
seems best to me. I cannot, now that this fate has come upon me, discard the arguments I 
used; they seem to me much the same. I value and respect the same principles as before.9 
Socrates ultimately does not find Crito’s arguments for escape persuasive. Rather, 
Socrates thinks that Crito should find the arguments for non-escape persuasive. So also, 
the laws of Athens, when imaginatively they speak at the end of the Crito, persuade 
Socrates that escape would be wrong. They expressly say, “be persuaded by us who 
have brought you up, Socrates” and “do not let Crito persuade you, rather than us.”10 
Fourth, Socrates identifies one's own moral self as the preeminent value in life. At 
his trial, Socrates upbraids the Athenians, saying “you do not care for nor give thought 
to wisdom or truth, or the best possible state of your soul.”11 Once convicted, Socrates 
asks that his accusers do him this favor:  
When my sons grow up, avenge yourselves by causing them the same kind of grief that 
I caused you, if you think they care for money or anything else more than they care for 
 
4 Confer Euthyphro, 12d-e. 
5 Crito, 54e. 
6 Crito, 44c. See also Crito 46d-e and 49b-c. 
7 Crito, 47a.  
8 See Apology 21b-23b. 
9 Crito, 46b-c. 
10 Crito, 54b-c. 
11 Apology, 29e. 
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virtue, or if they think they are somebody when they are  nobody. Reproach them as I 
reproach you, that they do not care for the right  things and think they are worthy when 
they are not worthy of anything.12 
Moral goodness is ranked more highly than wealth, reputation, honors,13 and one's 
body.14 Care to be good and wise is said to matter more than household affairs, 
prestigious offices, and political parties.15 Not surprisingly then, the search for moral 
virtue and reflection on the good life are so important that Socrates' most famous line is 
attached to them: “the unexamined life is not worth living.”16 So too in the Crito, 
Socrates’ focus on the moral self is referred to obliquely with expressions like “that part 
of ourselves that is improved by just actions and destroyed by unjust actions,”17 and its 
value is ranked higher than Socrates' own life and the lives of his children.18 The kind of 
care for the self that Socrates is advocating in his most famous line from the Apology is 
further specified in Socrates' questions: “Is life worth living for us with that part of us 
corrupted that unjust action harms and just action benefits?”19 and “Is the truth such as 
we used to say it was…wrongdoing is in every way harmful and shameful to the 
wrongdoer?”20 For Socrates, “the most important thing is not life, but the good life.”21  
 Though the principle of care for the self can sound like a self-absorbed 
preoccupation that privileges oneself over others, nothing in Socrates' words or life 
suggest that he thought of care for the self as a kind of ethical egoism. Rather, Socrates 
seems to recognize that any reason one could have for privileging oneself would equally 
apply to other people. Everybody is an I with desires, interests, goods, and possibilities 
for perfection and flourishing, and nobody is an I that honestly can say “I matter, but 
you do not” or “my desires, interests, goods, and possibilities matter more than yours.” 
Conversely, ethical altruism fails for the same reason. Nobody is an I that truthfully can 
say “you matter, but I do not” or “your desires, interests, goods, and possibilities matter 
more than mine.” Socrates's famous image of himself as a gadfly biting the great and 
noble horse22 of Athens contradicts the idea that care for the self is self-centered. It is 
also contradicted by Socrates' life-long commitment to the betterment of Athenians as 
captured in: “I go around doing nothing but persuading both young and old not to care 
for your body or your wealth in preference to or as strongly as for the best possible state 
of your soul.”23 Likewise, it is contradicted at the end of the Phaedo and just before 
drinking the hemlock when Socrates urges Crito, friends, and family above all else to 
take “good care of your own selves in whatever you do.”24  
 
12 Apology, 41e. 
13 Apology, 29e. 
14 Apology, 30b. 
15 Apology, 36b. 
16 Apology, 38a. 
17 Crito, 47d. 
18 See Crito, 54b. 
19 Crito, 47e. 
20 Crito, 49b. 
21 Crito, 48b. 
22 Apology, 30e. 
23 Apology, 30b. 
24 Phaedo, 115c. See also 82d and 107c. 
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Fifth, because moral goodness is preeminent, the principle of non-maleficence is 
prominent in the dialogues: “one must never do wrong.”25 In fact, Socrates seems to 
consider doing harm the essence of wickedness.26 Accordingly, at the beginning of the 
Apology Socrates criticizes his accusers who long before he was brought to trial had 
been “maliciously and slanderously”27 persuading Athenians that he was morally 
corrupt. In the middle of the dialogue, he says “my whole concern is not to do anything 
unjust or impious.”28 Just before the Athenian jury votes, Socrates explains that he has 
not resorted to courtroom theatrics (such as tears, supplication, or the pathetic display of 
children, friends, and family) because justice is not a favor rendered by the jury but 
rather a rational judgment according to the law.29 Finally, at the end of the Apology 
Socrates condemns his accusers who in accusing, convicting, and sentencing him to 
death attempted to harm him. He says, “they thought they were hurting me, and for this 
they deserve blame.”30 In the Crito, the specific form that the moral requirement of non-
maleficence also takes is as a requirement not to return wrong for wrong and injury for 
injury.31  
Because the principle of non-maleficence is so important, its rigor is worth 
emphasizing as a separate and sixth principle. When Socrates says “one must never do 
wrong,” he did not mean almost always or with practically few exceptions or virtually 
never. He means never. Period. Whatever the circumstances, motivations, or outcomes, 
people should never do harm or evil. This might be called the no proviso principle or, 
more informally, the no matter principle. No matter who, what, when, where, or why, 
people should refrain from wrongdoing. Without reservations or qualifications, refusal 
to do wrong is always the right thing to do. As Socrates puts it, a person “should look to 
this only in his action: whether what he does is right or wrong, whether he is acting like 
a good or a bad man,”32 and Socrates makes clear that one should do the right thing of 
refraining from harm without regard to personal risk, which includes “death and 
danger.”33 When the Athenians tried the Athenian generals who after the naval Battle of 
Arginusae in 406 BCE failed to save their own sailors from drowning, the Athenians 
unjustly tried them en masse rather than individually. Socrates, who as it happened was 
serving on the council of the assembly, says of himself: “I thought I should run the risk 
on the side of law and justice rather than join you, for fear of prison or death, when you 
were engaged in an unjust course.”34 So also, Socrates concludes the Apology clearly 
implying that to be condemned to die (as he is) is much better than to be condemned to 
wickedness and injustice (as the Athenian jury is).35 
Similarly, the importance of the principle of non-maleficence can be amplified in a 
second way with a seventh, separate principle: the principle of non-participation. 
People should not do evil themselves, nor should they ever participate in the evildoing 
 
25 Crito, 49a-b. 
26 See Apology, 25c-e. 
27 Apology, 18d.  
28 Apology, 32d. 
29 Apology, 34c-35d. 
30 Apology, 41e. 
31 Crito, 49b-d and 54c. 
32 Apology, 28c. 
33 Apology, 28c-d. 
34 Apology, 32b-c. 
35 See Apology, 39b and 41e. 
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of others. Even if the wrong is inevitable, one should still give witness to goodness by 
non-cooperation in the wrongdoing of others. Socrates tells two stories of his own 
public refusal to participate in evil. The first was just mentioned. At the trial of the 
generals after the Battle of Arginusae, Socrates stood against their being tried as a single 
group. He says, “I was the only member of the presiding committee to oppose your 
doing something contrary to the laws, and I voted against it.”36 The second public 
refusal took place two years later in 404 BCE. When the Thirty Tyrants ordered 
Socrates and others to arrest Leon of Salamis, an innocent man, and to bring him to his 
execution, Socrates alone refused and went home instead. The others continued to carry 
out Leon's arrest. Socrates says that the intention of the Thirty Tyrants was “to implicate 
as many as possible in their guilt” and that “I showed again, not in words but in action, 
that, if it were not rather vulgar to say so, death is something I couldn't care less about, 
but that my whole concern is not to do anything unjust or impious. That government, 
powerful as it was, did not frighten me into any wrongdoing.”37 Socrates' steadfast 
refusal manifests the agent-centered nature of morality. No matter what Socrates did, 
the generals and Leon were dead men. The outcomes were foregone conclusions. 
Injustice was also a foregone conclusion. But what makes all the difference morally is 
who the one morally corrupted by wrongdoing --whether others are unjust or Socrates is 
unjust. 
Eighth, in the Apology and Crito the principle of moral integrity or sticking to one’s 
beliefs is especially conspicuous. Socrates is consistent. He speaks to the Athenian jury 
in the normal way he always spoke, even though the jury expects to be pandered to. 
Socrates says to the jury that he will, as he always does, speak only the truth and that 
nothing will be “expressed in embroidered and stylized phrases” but expressed “at 
random and in the first words that come to mind.”38 So also, he offers no alternative 
punishment once he is convicted because doing so would contradict his belief in his 
innocence. Instead, in consistency with his lifelong commitment to the good of 
Athenians, he counteroffers a reward: “So if I must make a just assessment of what I 
deserve, I assess it at this: free meals in the Prytaneum.”39 Likewise, once Socrates is in 
prison, he refuses to escape and flee Athens because both would contradict his lifetime 
of service to Athens –a city he never left except for military service– and his refusal to 
offer banishment as his punishment at his trial.40  
Socrates' consistency is also manifested in his strict adherence to duty. He says, 
“wherever a man has taken a position that he believes to be best, or has been placed by 
his commander, there he must I think remain and face danger, without a thought for 
death or anything else, rather than disgrace.”41 He then mentions two shining instances 
of his own steadfastness.42 In the critical battles of Potidaea, Delium, and Amphipolis 
leading up to and in the Peloponnesian War, Socrates distinguished himself for his 
military service as an Athenian hoplite. He remained courageous and disciplined, even 
when the Athenians were routed. Similarly, Socrates interprets the Delphic oracle's 
pronouncement that nobody was wiser than himself as a divine command to practice 
 
36 Apology, 32b. 
37 Apology, 32c-d. 
38 Apology, 17c. 
39 Apology, 37a.  
40 Crito, 52b-c. 
41 Apology, 28d. Confer also Crito, 51b-52a. 
42 Confer Apology, 28d-30b and 21a-23b. 
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philosophy by examining whether those Athenians reputed to be wise were in fact wise. 
Accordingly, Socrates spent his life questioning, examining, and testing fellow 
Athenians and visitors of Athens, even though his obedience to that command entailed 
poverty, opposition, unpopularity, and persecution. 
Despite the many examples of Socrates' unswerving consistency –a consistency 
which often came at great risk and cost– Socrates can appear inconsistent regarding his 
duty to follow the laws of Athens. On the one hand, at the end of the Crito when 
Socrates has the laws speak, they speak clearly: “one must obey the commands of one's 
city and country, or persuade it as to the nature of justice.”43 On the other hand, in the 
Leon of Salamis affair, Socrates refused to follow the orders by the Thirty Tyrants to 
arrest Leon so that he could be executed. So also, Socrates says at his trial that, if his 
acquittal is on the condition that he quit the practice of philosophy, he will disobey and 
continue philosophizing.44 Where is the moral integrity in these inconsistencies? Is 
Socrates caught contradicting himself?  
Socrates has several plausible outs in the matter of Leon of Salamis. He might argue 
that laws are only laws when created by a proper authority and that the Thirty Tyrants 
were not a proper authority. Again, he might maintain that an unjust law is no law at all 
and that what does not exist cannot impose any obligations. Still again, he might 
distinguish between laws which, if followed, require joining one's will with evil versus 
those which, if followed, do not require joining one's will with evil. This last out is 
sometimes referred to as the distinction between formal cooperation and material 
cooperation. The point of the distinction is to clarify how not all participation in the 
wrongdoing of others is morally bad. Sometimes a person shares the intention of the 
wrongdoer, and sometimes a person does not, though the person is involved in the 
physical act of the wrongdoer. The former is formal cooperation and is always morally 
impermissible. The latter is material cooperation and is often morally permissible. One 
can defend Socrates' apparent inconsistency with the help of the distinction between 
formal and material cooperation thus: just as dutifully sitting in the back of the bus per 
Jim Crow laws is morally different from enforcing Jim Crow laws that demand some 
people sit in the back of the bus, so also Socrates' acceptance of his wrongful conviction 
and execution is morally different from his carrying out an injustice against Leon of 
Salamis. 
Similarly, Socrates has several plausible outs in the matter of a hypothetical acquittal 
tied to a cease-and-desist order. The most plausible is the one he expressly gives as his 
reason for his threatened disobedience of the jury's hypothetical verdict. He says, “I will 
obey the god rather than you.”45 
Two final moral truths are especially tricky to draw out. The first is a truth about 
moral conscience. Though moral standards are real and knowable, people at any given 
point can only do the best that they can do, and thus they must follow their best lights 
concerning what should and should not be done. This internal guide to right action that 
should be followed is one's last, best judgment about right and wrong. This can be 
called the principle of conscience. In the Euthyphro, Socrates calls this internal guide a 
“divine sign.”46 In the Apology, it is called both a “divine sign” and a “voice,”47 and in 
 
43 Crito, 51c. 
44 Apology, 29c-d. 
45 Apology, 29d. 
46 Euthyphro, 3b. 
47 Apology, 31c-d, 40a, and 41d. 
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the Phaedo, it is referred to as “conscience.”48 Socrates reports that “whenever it speaks 
it turns me away from something I am about to do, but it never encourages me to do 
anything.”49 This voice checks Socrates “even in small matters.”50 It kept Socrates out 
of the politics of Athens.51 On the day of his trial, the voice was silent, neither opposing 
his words or actions.52 Though one might suppose that the references to a “divine sign” 
and a “voice” mean Socrates enjoyed mystical experiences or suffered from psychotic 
episodes or experienced something else exotic, a simpler and more plausible 
interpretation is that Socrates is referring to the commands of one's own practical reason 
that can appear in inner experience as foreign to oneself because they clash with various 
other inner experiences such as desire and will which are also one's own.  
Why Socrates says in the Apology that his divine sign is limited to prohibitions or 
negative commands (what not to do) and does not extend to positive commands (what 
to do) is a puzzling question. The puzzle deepens when one notices that the point is 
contradicted in the Phaedo when Socrates says he has turned to composing poetry in his 
last days so as to satisfy his conscience.53 Thus, a positive action is commanded by 
conscience. But perhaps the reason Socrates connects his divine sign more tightly with 
negative commands is owing to another characteristic of conscience: it involves 
completely specific judgments in concrete circumstances. Conscience is not general, but 
rather about the here and now. Some prohibitions (some Do Nots), however, are 
completely specific because they are exceptionless. They apply always and everywhere. 
For example, various ways of mistreating other human beings are permanent 
prohibitions, such as do not steal, never rape, and no chattel slavery. Discerning such 
exceptionless moral norms (or at least many of them) does not require great wisdom. 
Since Socrates routinely denies that he is wise, he is perhaps less uncomfortable 
admitting that he has insight into negative moral norms.  
Positive moral commands, in contrast, do require greater wisdom. Who should one 
marry? What profession should one pursue? How should people honor their parents, 
especially given the dysfunction in their family? How should one spend the final 
months, weeks, days, and hours of one's life? These questions are much harder to 
answer, and so Socrates is much less willing to lay claim to the kind of wisdom required 
to answer such questions.  
The struggle to achieve reliability in conscience's completely specific and positive 
judgments about concrete circumstances is played out dramatically in the Euthyphro. At 
the beginning of the dialogue, Socrates is shocked to learn that Euthyphro thinks he is 
justified in prosecuting his father for murder. Socrates says: “Most men would not know 
how they could do this and be right. It is not the part of anyone to do this, but of one 
who is far advanced in wisdom.”54 Again, after Euthyphro explains the particulars of his 
case against his father, Socrates questions Euthyphro doubtfully, “Euthyphro, you think 
that your knowledge of the divine, and of piety and impiety, is so accurate that, when 
those things happened as you say, you have no fear of having acted impiously in 
 
48 Phaedo, 60e and 61b. 
49 Apology, 31d. 
50 Apology, 40a. 
51 See Apology, 31d. 
52 See Apology, 40a-b. 
53 See Phaedo, 60e and 61b. Perhaps the point is also contradicted when Socrates insists that the god 
ordered him to practice philosophy and to improve fellow Athenians (Apology, 29d-30b). 
54 Euthyphro, 4b. 
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bringing your father to trial?”55 At the end of the dialogue after Socrates has shown 
Euthyphro that he does not know what are piety and impiety and that he does not know 
whether or not the prosecution of his father is just (though nonetheless Euthyphro 
maintains his resolve to prosecute his father), readers recognize that Euthyphro's last, 
best judgment about what is to be done is unreliable and perhaps even erroneous. 
Similar struggles over other specific positive judgments also are played out dramatically 
in the Apology as questions arise about the reliability of the Athenians' concrete positive 
judgments that sanction the prosecution, conviction, and sentence of Socrates and in the 
Crito as Socrates considers Crito’s proposal of escape. 
A second truth tricky to draw out is the moral implications of Socrates’ arguments 
for the immortality of the soul in the Phaedo and his mythic stories at end of the 
Apology and in the Phaedo about the afterlife. Perhaps they have no moral implications. 
But that is hard to believe. The poetry composition that Socrates is engaged in at the 
beginning of the Phaedo is, as he says, a matter of conscience, and several times in the 
course of the Phaedo Socrates and his friends indicate that they could spend Socrates’ 
last few hours no better than thinking about whether death is the end. Socrates remains a 
serious person until his last breath. 
If Socrates’ arguments and stories do have moral consequences, what might they be? 
Here is one suggestion. All four of Socrates’ arguments for immortality fail at some 
level. Even if they prove that the human soul survives death, they fail to prove personal 
immortality –that the same particular person survives death as was alive before death. 
Likewise, even if they prove personal immortality, they fail to show that a disembodied 
human soul can function. Finally, even if they prove that it can function, they say 
nothing about the normal business in the afterlife. The mythic stories, however, that 
dominate the end of the Apology and Phaedo do fill in the details on both personal 
immortality, disembodied functions, and the normal business in the afterlife. Those 
details give reason to hope for an afterlife and give ultimate meaning to the pursuit of 
knowledge, goodness, and virtue that Socrates urged and engaged in his entire life but 
that never fully reached its completion. Without a personal afterlife something like the 
one Socrates describes, that lifelong pursuit has less clearly a point. In fact, it looks 
rather absurd. It is a road to nowhere. 
Socrates admits that his tale about the afterlife is made-up, but he nonetheless insists 
that the belief in it is worth the risk. In fact, he says, “a man should repeat this [tale] to 
himself as if it were an incantation.”56 The point of the tale seems to provide a 
satisfactory answer to the perennial question: why be moral? What does it matter in the 
end whether people are good or bad, fools or wise, cruel or kind, virtuous or vicious? 
Philosophy has no satisfactory answer. Proofs for the immortality of the soul do not 
entail personal immortality, and proofs for personal immortality do not entail anything 
about the content of the afterlife. Thus, some of the most important questions 
philosophy cannot answer. But believing, hoping, and longing that the story of human 
persons does not end uncompleted with their death but rather continues and reaches its 
perfection in an afterlife is the better way to live –the way one ought to live. This way 
of living might be called the principle of faith, hope, and love. 
Socrates dies calmly and cheerfully with faith in and hope for better things to come, 
and that way of dying is the best testimony to the belief in the afterlife that Socrates can 
offer. Thus, besides his many splendid examples of how to live well, Socrates also 
displays how to die well. With that display, Socrates offers one final piece of evidence 
 
55 Euthyphro, 4e. 
56 Phaedo, 114d. 
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that he was a remarkable individual in whom was found an admirable agreement 
between thought and action.  
Socrates has had his critics, of course. One of the sharpest and shrillest in recent 
decades is I. F. Stone, who in The Trial of Socrates57 claims that Socrates, among other 
things, was: insulting, arrogant, ostentatious, pretentious, condescending, boastful, 
snobbish, mock-modest, prejudiced, contemptuous, derisive, talkative, lacking in 
candor, dissembling, querulous, crotchety, inconsistent, nonsensical, neglectful, 
subversive, defamatory, compassionless, insensitive, self-aggrandizing, suicidal, anti-
egalitarian, anti-political, anti-democratic, and anti-Athenian. He also adds: a bad 
husband, a bad father, and a slacker. In short, the Socrates that emerges from Stone's 
reading of the primary texts differs greatly from the moral and intellectual exemplar 
described here. 
Which Socrates is more accurate?  Only a close, intelligent, and charitable reading of 
the primary texts can settle the question about which description of Socrates is closer to 
the mark. The reading of the primary texts (at least the Platonic texts) also has to be 
sophisticated because Plato was a sophisticated author. In various ways, Plato does not 
communicate his own thought openly and explicitly. The dialogue form veils his 
meaning. Some things are clearly ironic. Other things are reached by extrapolation. Still 
other things are not stated but rather displayed or exhibited as the dramatic action of the 
dialogues unfolds. With Plato, intelligent readers have to ask themselves continually 
why a given dialogue is written the way it is. They have to pay attention to who speaks, 
who fails to speak, when a person speaks or remains silent, when a person arrives or 
departs, what is the connection between the character of the person speaking and the 
position the person defends, why are various positions presented in the order that they 
are, and much more.  
Despite the many challenges in reading Plato and the need to let a careful reading of 
the primary texts determine who was Socrates, here are three indications that Stone's 
description of Socrates is not the more accurate one. First, Stone regards Socrates' 
pursuit of rationality as in his search for precise and rigorous definitions as “a wild 
goose chase” that often leads “nonsensical directions” and to “absurd statements.”58 The 
precise and rigorous definitions that Stone is talking about are verbal formulations that 
capture the core reality of what is defined and that apply to everything defined and 
nothing else. Because good definitions apply to what one is trying to define and nothing 
else, they are exceptionless. Another good term for exceptionless definitions is absolute 
definitions, and the latter is what Stone settles on. But Stone cannot even state his 
complaint about Socrates' absolutism regarding definitions without contradicting 
himself. Stone says, “The fact that all laws and general propositions have their 
exceptions does not destroy the value of laws and generalizations as guides to human 
conduct.”59 Notice, though, if all general propositions have exceptions, then what about 
Stone's own general proposition just quoted? Does it have exceptions or not? If it does 
not, then Stone's claim that all general propositions have exceptions is false because his 
own general proposition is exceptionless. If Stone's claim does have exceptions, then 
the exception would be certain exceptionless or absolute laws or general propositions, in 
which case Stone's claim is false yet again. Stone is trapped in a performative 
contradiction.  
 
57 See I.F. Stone, The Trial of Socrates (New York: Double Day, 1989). 
58 I.F. Stone, The Trial of Socrates, 68. 
59 I.F. Stone, The Trial of Socrates, 77. 
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In addition, Stone is simply wrong when he describes Socrates' pursuit of precise and 
rigorous definitions as a foolish pursuit of the unattainable (“a wild goose chase”) and 
as “impossible standards of Socratic logic.”60 Attentive readers of Plato recognize that 
progress in finding good definitions is regularly made in the course of the dialogues. In 
the Euthyphro, as already mentioned, a rather good definition of piety is hit upon: piety 
is a part of justice, namely, the part that is a kind of service of the gods.61 Moreover, the 
term service is also given content. The service is said to consist in prayer and sacrifice --
in begging and in giving. The term giving is given content as well. It is said to consist in 
honor, reverence, and gratitude.62 Furthermore, a fine example of honoring and gratitude 
to the gods is displayed in the Euthyphro and indeed in the entire life of Socrates: using 
the gift of rationality to the best of one's ability.  
Stone, in the end, is much like Euthyphro. Euthyphro can identify several elements 
of the definition of piety, but he does not recognize his own intellectual successes and 
soon argues himself into circles. Stone can recognize what Socrates is attempting, but 
he does not notice the advances Socrates makes and instead reasons himself into 
contradictions. Attentive readers, in contrast to both Euthyphro and Stone, do recognize 
the progress in the dialogue and appreciate the definition of piety that comes to light. 
Second, Stone finds Socrates to be cold-hearted or compassionless when in the 
Euthyphro Socrates challenges Euthyphro, a bumptious Athenian, who is in the midst of 
eagerly prosecuting his own father for murder.63 The story is that, after a servant 
(drunken and angry) of Euthyphro's family killed one of their slaves, Euthyphro's father 
responded by binding the servant and throwing him in a ditch. He left the servant there 
while inquiries were made about what should be done with the killer. While the father 
waited for replies to his inquiries, the servant died because the father failed to attend to 
the servant's needs. Nowhere in the dialogue does Socrates ever express pity for the 
poor servant as Stone thinks Socrates should. Stone also thinks Socrates' sense of justice 
is distorted because he takes exception to Euthyphro's treatment of his father.64  
Stone's charge of cold-heartedness and injustice has several problems, however. One, 
nobody in the dialogue shows any pity at the plight of either the dead servant or the 
dead slave, not Euthyphro, nor Socrates, nor Euthyphro's father and family. Thus, 
Stone's sensibilities are his own and supported by nothing in the dialogue. Two, 
Euthyphro himself says that he is “thought crazy to prosecute” his father.65 Similarly 
Euthyphro's father and relatives are outraged at Euthyphro's prosecution. Part of their 
anger centers on the charge: murder. The father did not kill the servant. The Athenian 
equivalent of reckless or negligent homicide is the more appropriate charge. Thus, 
Socrates is not the only person who is dubious of Euthyphro for good reasons. There are 
good reasons to be dubious. Three, Euthyphro is supremely confident in the justice of 
his actions. Readers should be more hesitant. Nor should they blame Socrates, if he is 
hesitant. Euthyphro's prosecution creates a colossal conflict of interests that is obvious 
to anybody. Does Stone really think the impartiality that justice demands is ensured 
when family members are both defendants and plaintiffs? Recusal was the appropriate 
way for Euthyphro to handle his father's case. Four, Euthyphro is also supremely 
 
60 I.F. Stone, The Trial of Socrates, 71. 
61 Euthyphro, 12d-e and 13d. See I.F. Stone, The Trial of Socrates, 147, for his view that the dialogue 
makes no progress on the definition of piety. 
62 Euthyphro, 14b-15a. 
63 I.F. Stone, The Trial of Socrates, 146-149. 
64 I.F. Stone, The Trial of Socrates, 149-152. 
65 Euthyphro, 4a. 
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confident that his actions are pious. But are they? They certainly do not seem to be 
pious toward or honoring of his father. Nor is the sort of hostility that precedes and 
results from dragging another person into court something between father and son that 
is clearly commendable and approved from a God's eye point of view. 
Stone's also misjudges in another way the justness of Socrates in the Euthyphro 
because Stone does not understand the demands of justice, specifically retributive 
justice. Stone thinks Euthyphro had “an obligation as a human being and a citizen to see 
that justice was done,”66 and Stone clearly thinks the obligation is absolute or 
exceptionless (that it, it is obligatory regardless of conditions, circumstances, 
consequences, ultimate purposes, the identity of the acting person, and so forth), even 
though he mocks the idea of exceptionless moral obligations elsewhere.67 But 
retributive justice, while truly good, is not a good that must always be pursued, and for 
many sound reasons it might not be pursued. Sometimes punishment leads to more 
crime, to more injustice, to more danger, or to other undesirable outcomes such as large 
expenditures of time, money, and effort that one prefers to direct elsewhere. When 
punishment has these results, not pursuing it is sensible. Similarly, that retributive 
justice is good does not entail that every person has an equal obligation to pursue it. 
Retributive justice, like so many goods in this world, is attractive and worth pursuing. 
But since the same can be said for other goods and the pursuit of some of them is 
incompatible with the pursuit of others, no specific good is absolutely obligatory. Even 
less must a specific good always be pursued to a specific degree. Still less must a 
concrete instantiation of a specific good (like the prosecution of Euthyphro's father) 
always be pursued. 
Third, on the critical question of Socrates' role in his own death, Stone argues that he 
committed suicide. His argument is unconvincing. In fact, it is quite poor. He says 
Socrates “chose death over a renewed chance of life. The choice he made was 
voluntary, and therefore the equivalent of suicide.”68 Here Stone is mistaken. Socrates' 
choice was not the equivalent of suicide. Socrates chose compliance with the Athenian 
jury's sentence and non-escape from prison. He accepted his death as a consequence of 
those choices. Stone's confused logic about choices leads to one absurdity after another. 
His logic would make parents murderers because they choose to bring children into this 
world even though they know the children will ultimately die. It would mean that 
investors welcome and desire their losses when their ventures fail because they choose 
to invest even though they know that their investments might fail. It would entail that 
the various ill effects of medical treatment like chemotherapy (hair loss, nausea, 
vomiting, a compromised immune system, and so forth) are the object of choice because 
doctors and patients know that those are the consequences of that treatment. It would 
mean that Stone wanted the embarrassment of having his shoddy reasoning exposed 
here. After all, he voluntarily wrote what he wrote and then published it in a book.   
Where exactly does Stone's logic go wrong? Answer: the source of Stone's confusion 
lies in the failure to make a simple distinction between the foreseen and the chosen or 
intended. The two are not equivalent, and the former does not imply the latter. What 
person P knows may or definitely will result when person P acts is not the same as what 
person P wills as an end or as the means to whatever end person P wills. Thus, not 
everything a person knows will (or likely will) be brought about by an action is 
 
66 I.F. Stone, The Trial of Socrates, 148.  
67 I.F. Stone, The Trial of Socrates, 76-77.  
68 I.F. Stone, The Trial of Socrates, 195. 
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intended. Many things that are brought about lie beyond the scope of intention. The 
conceptually precise term for things brought about in this way is unintended 
consequences, but other terms are also serviceable: side effects (commonly used in 
medicine), collateral damage (the favored jargon when the bad results are from military 
operations), and externalities (preferred in economics). While unintended consequences 
are not willed in the precise sense of chosen or intended, they are willed or voluntary in 
some way. Specifically, one willingly goes forward with a proposed action that one 
knows may (or definitely will) bring about the unintended consequences that one has 
foreseen, as opposed to doing something else that does not have the unintended 
consequences or as opposed to doing nothing at all. Because unintended consequences 
are voluntarily brought about, people are responsible for them. They own the 
unintended consequences. Because the unintended consequences are often bad, the 
moral goodness of people is at risk. Sometimes bringing about bad unintended 
consequences indeed makes people morally bad, and sometimes bringing them about 
does not. But sorting out the exact criteria for when unintended consequences are or are 
not morally justified is not needed to recognize that Stone fails even to make the critical 
distinction presupposed by the criteria: not all that is foreseen is intended. 
The accurate way of describing Socrates' actions, as a result, is not that he chose 
death or that he committed suicide. Just because he knew that the choices that he made 
would lead to his death and he could have made alternative choices that would have 
preserved his life does not mean his death was intended. Rather, the accurate description 
is that Socrates chose to follow the sentence of the Athenian court by remaining in 
prison and drinking hemlock as ordered and that he accepted his death as an unintended 
consequence of that choice. 
In the end, Stone's iconoclastic account of Socrates is suspect. The closer one looks 
at Stone's claims the more suspect is Stone's account. It is the product of bad reasoning 
(as shown above), as well as (but not shown here) tendentious interpretations of primary 
texts, conjecture about counterfactuals of the form “had Socrates done X instead of Y, 
then Z would have resulted,” and debatable assertions about the historical context of 
Socrates' life. Perhaps even worse, Stone's Socrates is at the end of the day not even an 
interesting figure with anything valuable to say. Instead, he is a forgettable jerk. 
Alternatively, Socrates' words and actions in Plato's four dialogues that chronicle 
Socrates' final weeks, when examined sympathetically, give witness to many important 
moral truths: the ten identified here and still others. Because Socrates' moral insight is 
particularly keen, he is a friendly guide worth listening to. Because Socrates’ own life is 
so exemplary, his life is a model worth imitating. Socrates lived strictly in accord with 
his moral principles even when doing so meant his death. So extraordinary was this man 
Socrates that his friends considered him to be “the best, and also the wisest and the most 
upright”69 person that they ever knew and even his executioner, who wept at Socrates’ 
death, said he was “the noblest, the gentlest, and the best man”70 that he ever was 




69 Phaedo, 118a. 
70 Phaedo, 116c. 
71 Though the secondary literature on Socrates is enormous, readers interested in that literature have to 
begin somewhere. A few recommendations for further reading are the works by Nails, Rowe, Ober, 
Millett, Reeve, Brickhouse, and Smith in the bibliography. The notes and references in these works 
readily connect readers to the larger universe of Socratic literature.  
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Dorothy l. Sayers pronounced her conference The Lost Tools of Learning in 1947. By 
that time she was quite famous in UK as a detective novels writer. In fact, that year she 
began being the President of the Detection Club, founded by herself and G. K. 
Chesterton in 1928. 
Nevertheless in 1947 Sayers was no interested anymore in writing novels. She was 
focused in her translation of Dante’s Comedy, and she was far more interested in writing 
essays than fiction. After the Second World War her commitment was to understand the 
Mind of the Maker (the act of creation by God and by Man) and the meaning of work 
and laity. For her these topics were necessary to avoid the possibility of another crisis 
like the one that had just devastated Europe. Sayers was convinced of how nihilism 
could be overcome only through meaning or sense, and through education. 
1. A problem on education 
But what is it to educate? It is such a common activity, it belongs so much to the 
daily life, that most of us do not even care about the real meaning of that activity. Every 
time in History the human being has a problem of perspective. Man tends to think that 
his moment, his present, even his place, is the good one, and so he puts in dare straits 
the chance to learn from the past an to improve his future. 
Sayers decided to try to learn from the past. She looked at her present and she didn’t 
like what she saw. Although she considered herself an amateur in education, one 
excellent reason for her to “feel entitled to have an opinion about education” was that 
“if we are not all professional teachers, we have all, at some time or another, been 
taught. Even if we learnt nothing—perhaps in particular if we learnt nothing—our 
contribution to the discussion may have a potential value.”2 
Sayers uses in her text two important resources: a witty sense of humor, and an open 
mind against specialization. The first resource, humor, helps to engage the audience. It 
is like oil in a machinery. The audience gets confident with the speaker and both share a 
sense of complicity. The second, her openness to give opinions even if it is not her field 
of specialization is deeply related to her doctrine: she has not learned a specialized field 
to talk about, just a small dot in the universe of knowledge, but the tools that make her 
able to talk about the main concerns of humankind. And one of these concerns is, 
indeed, education. 
 
1 Professor at University Francisco de Vitoria in Madrid (Spain). Email: fjavier.aranguren@ufv.es 
2 We will follow D. Sayers, The Lost Tools of Learning, reprinted with the kind permission of David 
Higham Associates, London, UK, for distribution through the Cary Christian School website 
(www.carychristianschool.org), 2016, p. 4. There is a recent translation into Spanish: Dorothy L. Sayers, 
Aprender y trabajar. Introducción, traducción y notas de Javier Aranguren (Pamplona: Eunsa, 2019). 
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Sayers begins her The Lost tools of Learning pointing out two interesting ideas. The 
first one underlines how “that artificial prolongation of intellectual childhood and 
adolescence into the years of physical maturity which is so marked in our own day.”3 In 
the Medieval Age the students used to join the university (if they did so) at fourteen or 
fifteen4. Now they come at 18 and they are not even ready to work with intelectual 
tools. “The stock argument in favor of postponing the school-leaving age and 
prolonging the period of education generally is there is now so much more to learn than 
there was in the Middle Ages. This is partly true, but not wholly. The modern boy and 
girl are certainly taught more subjects— but does that always mean that they actually 
know more?.”5 She is not optimistic about this possible relationship: subjects and 
knowledge don’t go always together. 
In fact, Sayers insists, it is sad to realize “that today, when the proportion of literacy 
throughout Western Europe is higher than it has ever been, people should have become 
susceptible to the influence of advertisement and mass propaganda to an extent hitherto 
unheard of and unimagined.”6 And these lines were not written in a moment of 
compulsory consumption or when the short messages of Twitter or WhatsApp were the 
main source of literature for the young (and adult) generation. Do the students today 
know how to disentangle fact from opinion and the proven from the plausible? Do they 
have a critical capacity? 
If we go to the political debate, at least in many democracies, we could face a similar 
pessimistic impression. “Have you ever, in listening to a debate among adult and 
presumably responsible people, been fretted by the extraordinary inability of the 
average debater to speak to the question, or to meet and refute the arguments of 
speakers on the other side?”, asks Sayers.7 And we have, for sure. The same thing 
usually happens in work meetings, in the newspapers, in the biases and tribalism that we 
find and back up everyday in the social networks. Can the students today be easily 
manipulated by the Media, the Social Networks, the common places or the political 
correctness and the public indoctrination campaigns? 
2. A proposal for a solution 
Dorothy L. Sayers proposes a solution to this concerns. For her “the great defect of 
our education today [is] that although we often succeed in teaching our pupils 
‘subjects’, we fail lamentably on the whole in teaching them how to think: they learn 
everything, except the art of learning.”8 To use other words, Sayers defends that 
Educacion should be more concentrated in teaching habits that in, for example, 
memorizing the name of the capitals cities in East Africa. At the end of the day, that can 
be acquired without any teacher, but the habits, cannot. The habits are closely related to 
craftsmanship. To learn them every student needs a master, a personal trainer, that will 
show to the pupil how to learn by herself. The capital cities can be memorized by heart 
at any moment, but the tools of learning need accompaniment and expertise. An 
example: the core curriculum system does not consist just in reading text. The 
 
3 Cf. p. 5. 
4 Cf. Javier Aranguren, La universidad, sus alumnos y sus profesores (Pamplona: Eunsa, 2019), 60. 
5 Dorothy Sayers, The Lost Tools of Learning, 6. 
6 Idem. 
7 Idem. 
8 Dorothy Sayers, The Lost Tools of Learning, 10. 
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conversation, the debate, is the most important moment of learning. Hutchins, Adler or 
the Aspen Institute work always with this idea.9 
In the Medieval Syllabus this idea was also present. In the Trivium Grammar and 
Dialectic were no ‘subjects’ but “methods of dealing with subjects. Grammar, indeed, is 
a “subject” in the sense that it does mean definitely learning a language—at that period 
it meant learning Latin. But language itself is simply the medium in which thought is 
expressed. The whole of the Trivium was, in fact, intended to teach the pupil the proper 
use of the tools of learning, before he began to apply them to “subjects” at all.”10 The 
main goal of this stage of education was “not merely to write an essay on paper, but to 
speak audibly and intelligibly from a platform, and to use his wits quickly when 
heckled.”11 
It means that the student was playing a game. Doesn’t happen the same with sports 
today? The children learn how to play soccer by playing, and meanwhile they learn also 
the rules, how to cheat to the referee, how to improve their technique, or how to play as 
a team. The players don’t sit down in a classroom to get theory first: they learn by 
living, it is a practical experience. 
How does a person learn how to play a game, or an instrument? Playing it before 
knowing how to play it. Any person that has had a neighbor trying to learn how to play 
the violin knows what we are saying. “We learn the things that we don’t know by doing 
them”12: building houses, playing a guitar…, or learning to learn.  
If “modern education concentrates on teaching subjects, leaving the method of 
thinking, arguing, and expressing one’s conclusions”, “mediaeval education 
concentrated on first forging and learning to handle the tools of learning, using 
whatever subject came handy as a piece of material on which to doodle until the use of 
the tool became second nature.”13 Aristotle considered that culture was like a second 
nature, the moral development of the human being, the ‘learning how to live’ of the 
human being. The greek idea of paideia, as well as the Medieval idea of formation, has 
more to do with uprising a character than with learning a ‘subject’. It has more to do 
with learning how to learn or with cultivating a critical thinking attitude that at the end 
should become natural to the student. 
Nowadays “we let our young men and women go out unarmed, in a day when armor 
was never so necessary. By teaching them all to read, we have left them at the mercy of 
the printed word. By the invention of the film and the radio, we have made certain that 
no aversion to reading shall secure them from the incessant battery of words, words, 
words (…). We who were scandalized in 1940 when men were sent to fight armored 
tanks with rifles, are not scandalized when young men and women are sent into the 
world to fight massed propaganda with a smattering of ‘subjects’.”14 Sayers is 
suggesting that the students don’t need to get to sources of information (they are indeed 
at hand), but just how to deal with them. We can remember a metaphor proposed by 
Sayers’ friend, C. S. Lewis in his book Miracles: a young girl in a Pharmacy is at risk of 
 
9 Robert. M. Hutchins, “The Aims of Education”, in Education for Freedom, (Lousiana: Louisiana UP, 
1947), 19–38. 
10 Dorothy Sayers, The Lost Tools of Learning, 12. 
11 Idem. 
12 Aristotle, Nicomaquean Ethic, III, 2. 
13 Dorothy Sayers, The Lost Tools of Learning, 13. On this topic: Javier Aranguren, “El renacimiento del 
pensamiento crítico en las primeras universidades”, en La universidad, sus alumnos y sus profesores, 13–
39. 
14 Dorothy Sayers, The Lost Tools of Learning, 16. 
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taking medicines just because they are ‘very atractive red pills’15. If the girl has the 
access to all the medicines but not the skills to deal with them, she is in a clear danger, 
“unarmed and unequipped”. 
3. Sayers’ program and stages 
As Sayers is offering the tools of learning, her proposal has to be started at the 
beginning of the educational process. The Author makes a distinction among three 
different stages: “the Poll-Parrot, the Pert, and the Poetic—the latter coinciding, 
approximately, with the onset of puberty.”16 She classifies these three moments, closely 
related to the different stages of the human psychological development. “The Poll-
Parrot stage is the one in which learning by heart is easy and, on the whole, 
pleasurable.”17 It is the age to exorcize more memory than reason. The age of rhymes 
and rhythm.  
After that should come the Pert age. A time to quarrel, contradict, answer back, 
liking to catch people out (specially the elders), as a signal of the arriving of someone 
who was not there before: a Person, a novelty.  
“The Poetic age is popularly known as the ‘difficult’ age. It is self-centered; it yearns 
to express itself; it rather specializes in being misunderstood; it is restless and tries to 
achieve independence; and, with good luck and good guidance, it should show the 
beginnings of creativeness; a reaching out towards a synthesis of what it already knows, 
and a deliberate eagerness to know and do some one thing in preference to all others.”18 
 
Stage Age Trivium 
Poll Parrot 9 to 11 Grammar 
Pert 12 to 14 Dialectic 
Poetic 15 to 16 Rethoric 
University 16 to … Quadrivium 
(College) 
 
Relationship among stages, age and Trivium 
 
Each learning age fits with a different moment of maturity.  
Poll–Parrot for children; Pert for the maturity of childhood. Poetic for the teens. It 
would be a big error to deal with the students using tools that they are not yet ready to 
use or from which they have already gone beyond. At the same time, each age and each 
layer in the learning process is related with one of the three fields of the Trivium: 
Grammar for Poll–Parrot children (including latin and other languages, so that they can 
structure the mind of the learner). They will learn about other topics (History, 
Geography, Science, Maths, even Theology) always in a Poll–Parrot way: through 
anecdotes and events, maps, studying the classification of the spices or the 
 
15 C. S. Lewis, Miracles. A Preliminary Study, (London: Collins, 2012), ch. 10. 
16 Dorothy Sayers, The Lost Tools of Learning, 18. 
17 Idem. 
18 Idem., 19. 
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multiplication table and “the students should become acquainted with the story of God 
and Man in outline—i.e., the Old and New testaments presented as parts of a single 
narrative of Creation, Rebellion, and Redemption—and also with the Creed, the Lord’s 
Prayer, and the Ten Commandments. At this early stage, it does not matter nearly so 
much that these things should be fully understood as that they should be known and 
remembered.”19 All these things are perfect for this level. Of course, they would be a 
joke if at the other two levels they continued studying with this layout. 
Something analogous would apply for the Pert and the Poetic stages. Sayer’s 
proposal reviews learning materials always using a sloping learning process so that the 
students start reading little by little deeper texts having always in mind that what the 
students really need to do is to exercise their rational and critical capacities. It doesn’t 
matter the topic as much as the use of “the spontaneous development of the ratiocinative 
faculty and the natural and proper thirst of the awakening reason for the definition of 
terms and exactness of statements. All events are food for such an appetite. An umpire’s 
decision; the degree to which one may transgress the spirit of a regulation without being 
trapped by the letter: on such questions as these children are born casuists, and their 
natural propensity only needs to be developed and trained—and especially, brought into 
an intelligible relationship with the events in the grown-up world.”20 
Conclusion 
Sayers’ diagnostic is not optimistic. She expresses the opinion that the Western 
World has been making a living from its capital, “but one cannot live on capital 
forever»21. The roots have been neglected. «We have lost the tools of learning—the axe 
and the wedge, the hammer and the saw, the chisel and the plane—that were so 
adaptable to all tasks. Instead of them, we have merely a set of complicated jigs, each of 
which will do but one task and no more, and in using which eye and hand receive no 
training, so that no man ever sees the work as a whole or ‘looks to the end of the 
work’.”22 
Sayers demands the return of reflexion, of philosophy, of the skills provided by the 
critical thinking attitude. This has all to do with the formation of a character. Instead of 
that our students are lost piling tasks and working hard… but having nowhere to go. 
The educational structure has been built upon sand. The students work hard, but they do 
not achieve the only true end of education: to teach men how to learn for themselves, to 
provide tools for them so that they can become free an think out of the cave, out of the 
box, by themselves. 
 
19 Cf. idem, 20–24. 
20 Idem., 27. 
21 Idem., 35. 
22 Idem. 
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Since the past few decades there has been a renewed interest in the approach to 
ancient philosophy which understands it firstly and foremost as a way of life, and from 
this interest there have been throughout thought methods to the study of ancient 
philosophy, like the one developed prominently by Pierre Hadot. This interest towards 
ancient philosophy as a way of life is seen both in the academia and also in the public. 
While within the academia, as it is natural to its milieu, the approach remains a detached 
one, in the general public the demand for such an approach is also a demand in 
connection to value education, among other things. In other words, in academia one 
tends to go into this subject as a mere historiographical phenomenon being guided by 
research questions such as: In what extent is the philosophical production in antiquity 
related to a certain practice of spiritual exercises typical of the philosophical school out 
of which this or that philosophical work emerged? The general public, on the other 
hand, tends to regard this field looking rather for a source in the earliest roots of western 
civilization for value education, and generally also for wisdom suitable for today's 
world. This kind of public interest towards antiquity in general and towards ancient 
philosophy in particular impose a big task to academics, namely the task of addressing 
the question of how to bring ancient philosophy closer to the public to contribute to the 
value and character education. It is often the case that the endeavor of interpretation and 
detached argumentation of academics in this field becomes so detailed and abstract, that 
the gap between the academic work and the public interest become so large, that the 
latter can almost not profit from the first at all. I believe that the gap might be shortened, 
among other endeavors, with the aid of didactics in general, and subject didactics (ger. 
Fachdidaktik), in particular. Didactics has often, among its duties, the task of purveying 
overviews. The idea of a way of life can be put in the foreground in the introduction to 
the history philosophy, which is a main subdiscipline of its didactics (that is, the 
didactics of general philosophy). This can and should be made especially in the case of 
antiquity.  
I would like in this paper to contribute to the broad picture of ancient philosophy as a 
way of life and as spiritual exercises, as presented and defended particularly by Pierre 
Hadot, by trying to present how does philosophy and a philosophical school looked like 
in the texts of one contemporary of Plato, called by some his big contender: Isocrates. In 
order to do that I will also dedicate some words to Hadot's approach. 
 
1 This article is based on a talk delivered by the author on October 17, 2019 in the III European Liberal 
Arts and Core Texts Education at the University of Navarra. The author has revised and completed it in 
October 2020. 
2 PhD Student of Philosophy, University of Bonn, Germany. Email: jose.fernandez@uni-bonn.de 
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We will focus on just one of Isocrates speeches, the Antidosis speech, which stands 
out among his other works as a particularly important document for our purposes. The 
Antidosis speech of Isocrates is particularly important as a testimony of the 
understanding of philosophy as a way of life in vogue in classical Athens. One can at 
this point complaint that the works of Isocrates are not unanimously considered among 
the core texts of Western tradition, and are far from being so considered when compared 
to those of Plato. Be that as it may, the plainness in which the text and its arguments 
unfold show us a pristine picture of how philosophy was conceived by some as way of 
life and of educating the character in the Athens in times of Plato, that it represent an 
invaluable testimony and in some regards a testimony without comparison so far I can 
tell. Didactically then, a first reading of the speech may provide the students with an 
insight of the lived practice of philosophy, in order to, after the lecture of the Antidosis 
speech, to venture the reading of a classical work of Plato like the Menon, or the 
Gorgias with this scope fresh in mind. 
The paper will go first into a general introduction of the work in question. For that I 
will present an overview of the non-philosophical content of the speech (1.). The 
discussion of the philosophical aspects of the speech, that is, the discussion of the most 
important subjects of the work for my purposes here will be left to the third section (3.). 
Before that I will introduce some key concepts of Pierre Hadot's approach (2.). Finally, I 
will discuss some further ideas regarding the conception of philosophy outlaid in 
Isocrates' Antidosis (4.), in relation with rhetoric. For that I will briefly discuss the ideas 
of Hannah Arendt in her book The Human Condition about the essential trait of the 
public sphere in Classical Greece as compared to nowadays. 
1. Antidosis-speech as a political and self-defense plea. 
The Antidosis speech stands out among Isocrates' work for providing a portrait in 
first person of his life and deeds. While most of his other writings are either directly 
political speeches (v. g. On Peace, Panegiricus), which tackle mainly inner and outer 
political problems of Athens, or letters to his pupils and friends (v. g. Letter to Nicocles, 
Letter to Demonicos), which consist mostly of advices for the improvement of their 
virtue, the Antidosis is a fictional defense speech in which Isocrates gives an account of 
his whole life. It was written as he was 82 years old, as he himself tells us in the 
introduction3. The defense speech occurs within a fictional court trial in which Isocrates 
is accused of corrupting the youth, i. e. his pupils.  Isocrates himself states the fictional 
character of the speech in the introduction, where he invokes as the motivation to write 
it a real court trial in which he was counter-demanded (a kind of trial called Antidosis) 
to pay a liturgy. Liturgies were a special tax imposed to rich Athenian citizens after a 
trial which was about showing that the demanded was wealthy enough to afford the tax. 
The tax consisted in the cost of one of the Greek warships, the trireme. The demanded 
could got discharged of the tax by means of demanding another citizen to pay the tax 
instead of him. This second trial was called Antidosis, and in it the accuser (i. e. the 
person who was previously tried to pay the liturgy) claimed the new demanded was 
wealthier than himself and that the latter should be charged with the liturgy instead of 
the first. In real life, Isocrates had been tried in the past by another wealthy citizen 
called Megaclides in one of those Antidosis trials, he lost the trial and had to pay the tax 
(cf. Guzmán Hermida, Vol. II, 75). His fictional Antidosis speech is accordingly not part 
 
3 If this date is correct, Isocrates wrote the Antidosis speech around 354-353 BC. 
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of his defense in that real Antidosis-prosecution. The fictional Antidosis speech we have 
was probably conceived as a personal discharge to restore the unfair reputation Isocrates 
got after the real trial of been an excessively rich citizen or of having not contributed to 
the city accordingly to his wealth. He himself states later in the text, that he always 
contributed to the city more than the strict amount the laws demanded from him to do 
(cf. 145-146). At any rate, after the real trial he should have gotten the impression not 
only that he was considered to be unfairly rich, but also the impression that he, his life 
and his work were deeply misunderstood, and that could be why he decided to wrote 
this fictional defense speech in which to give account of his life and deeds. Some of the 
passages of the text give us a great remembrance of Plato's Apology of Socrates. In his 
defense, Isocrates provides a brief overview of his life.  
The accusation of which the fictional speech is a defense was the typical accusation 
charged against the sophists, as I already said above: to corrupt the youth, charge 
famously pressed also against Socrates. In the speech Isocrates defends himself of the 
accusation by exposing his vision of philosophy, education and rhetoric. In it he also 
exposes his views about the political situation of Athens.4 All these four subjects are 
addressed by Isocrates as closely connected and interwoven.  
Isocrates first refers to the accusation and to the arguments supporting it. The accuser 
Lysimachus argues that Isocrates has another trait typical to the Sophists beside 
corrupting the youth, namely the ability to make the strongest argument to appear as the 
weakest and the weakest to appear to be the strongest. This strategy, claims Isocrates, is 
thought to let Isocrates appears guilty in both of the following scenarios: if he speaks 
well, which would hint that he is a sophist, and also if he speaks poorly, in which case 
his case (namely, to be innocent) will appear less true than Lysimachus' case, namely, 
that Isocrates is guilty (15-17). 
He then goes on to complaint that it is often the case in trials, that after the accusers 
had exposed their case against the accused and drawing such a depiction of the accused 
in order that he gets disliked by the judges and the jury, the jury is than ill-disposed 
towards the accused and will not consider the defense's arguments with the same 
benevolence they heard the accusers arguments moments before. Another vice goes 
hand in hand with this, namely, the tendency of accusers to present calumnies in their 
accusations. If on average the trials show a tendency of prejudging guilt of the accused 
for the reason just exposed, which Isocrates claims is a fact in Athens more than other 
cities, that very fact makes the presenting of a calumnious accusation to be more 
probable to succeed than if the two parties were heard equally. The culture of calumnies 
has gone so far, continues Isocrates, that to have always strived for an honest life is no 
guarantee to be completely safe from accusations in Athens (17-28). 
The indictment is read and the charge of corrupting the youth (i. e. his pupils) is 
stated: the corruption of the pupils is according to the indictment brought about by 
means of “teaching to speak and gain their own advantage in the courts contrary to 
justice” (30). Isocrates distinguishes the present accusation from the calumnies of which 
he was victim in the past and demands from the judges and the jury to attend 
exclusively on the present accusation, and to pay no attention to the calumnies of the 
past, and to judge him “to be the kind of man which the accusation and the defense in 
this trial will show me to be; for if you decide the case on this basis, you will have the 
 
4 He states that he always cared about the issues of the city, just like he did with respect to the issues of 
whole Greece (panhellenism). Like in other speeches, he stresses here his views about why Athens should 
be the leading city of Greece, how it rightly got to this leading role and how it should maintain its 
predominance over the other competing cities, especially Sparta.   
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credit of judging honourably and in accordance with the lay, while I, for my part, shall 
obtain my complete deserts” (32). Then he goes on to argue that, had he done any harm 
in the past, the victims of his mischievous acts would have come forward in this trial to 
speak against him. The fact that no such man shows up in the present trial is an 
indication that Isocrates never wronged anyone in the past (cf. 33-36). A central point of 
his defense is the claim that Isocrates is rather alien to the speeches pertaining to private 
court trials. This is important, becausem according to the accusation, the pupils of 
Isocrates used the rhetorical skills conveyed to them by him to unjustly profit from 
winning in such court trials by means of arguing fallaciously. But Isocrates states that 
he never concerned with private trial speeches, but almost exclusively with speeches of 
public or political affairs.5 A further argument by means of which he sets himself apart 
from the writers of private trial speeches is pointing out to the fact that the writers of 
speeches for litigation are very numerous and that none of them “has ever been thought 
worthy to have pupils, while I, as my accuser states, have had more than all the rest 
together who are occupied with philosophy” (41). He then goes on to depict the kind of 
speeches he has specialized in, namely the political speeches. This kind of speeches is 
not only much nobler than the litigation speech, but also more pleasant to hear and 
“more akin to the works composed in rhythm and music than to the speeches which are 
made in court” (46-47). Besides, the writer of political speeches is inspired by 
philosophy, whereas the court speech writer is capable of writing merely thanks to the 
capacity of intrigue. Besides, the latter are only tolerated to speak during the trial, 
whereas the firsts are “held in high esteem in every society and at all times” (48-49). He 
then goes on to refer to his own occupation with politics, and in concrete with the 
writing of political speeches about the role of Greece in the world and about fostering 
and defending the hegemony of Athens in the Greek world. He let a clerk read passages 
of political speeches his published in the past, namely: the Panegyricus (§ 51-99), On 
the Pease (§ 25-56, § 132-145), and the discourse To Nicocles (§ 14-39). This last 
speech is addressed to Nicocles as he was the king of the Salaminians. Isocrates claims 
that in that speech he did not address the king as an adulator seeking the king's favor. 
On the contrary, “since in addressing a king I have spoken for his subjects, surely I 
would urge upon men who live under a democracy to pay court to the people”. (70-71). 
To further exalt the dignity of this occupation of him (i. e. the writing of political 
speeches) he goes on to compare it with another worthy occupation, namely the creation 
of just laws. Hereby he claims that the creation of public speeches is even nobler than 
the creation of just laws, because “while any number of men both among the Hellenes 
and among the barbarians have been able to lay down laws, there are not many who can 
discourse upon questions of public welfare in a spirit worthy both of Athens and of 
Hellas” (80-81). Besides, he continues, given that the amount of political discourses and 
of laws are innumerable, whereas the legislator can easily copy laws already invented 
without having the need of feeling shame for having done this, the speaker should 
procure not to copy discourses of other while composing his own discourses, because 
the ones who do the such are “regarded as shameless babblers” (83). He later 
complaints about the inadequacy of his accusers of using arguments that are equally 
employed against the innocent as against the guilty: just going on talking with long 
speeches about the mischievousness of sophistry does not contribute to the argument 
that the accused is indeed guilty of sophistry (88-92). Isocrates continues his defense 
and names a few renown students of his in order to further substantiate his plea that he 
 
5 He did actually work briefly as a Logograph writing private court trials before he founded his rhetorical 
or rather philosophical school. 
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did not corrupt his pupils, but rather that he contributed to the education not few of 
Athens's most prominent leaders, like Eunomus, Lysitheides, Callippus; Onetor, 
Anticles, Philonides, Philomelus and Charmantides (92-100). Isocrates then goes on to 
refer extensively about a friend of his and also a former pupil, the general Timotheus. 
He and his friendship with Isocrates were mentioned by the accuser Lysimachos in his 
speech of accusation, according to which both Isocrates and Timotheus appear shown as 
being bad citizens. Isocrates recovers the reputation of Timotheus claiming that he was 
the general who gained for the hegemony of Athens the submission of the most quantity 
of cities with the least resources. He praises Timotheus' strategic intelligence and his 
mercy and kindness in treating the subdues neighbor poleis, so that thanks to him, 
Athens did not appear threatening to them and therefore these fellow cities remained 
faithful to Athens's leadership. Likewise, he explained the bad reputation of Timotheus 
by invoking his lack of strategy and of talent in what we would now call networking or 
public relationship, that is, is neglect of flattering the other leading Athenian politicians 
he dealt with (101-139). 
After that Isocrates goes back to his own defense. He reproduces a warning of an 
unnamed friend of him who told him once, that even though he procured his whole life 
to live honestly in order to have peace and avoid trouble with his fellow citizen, that 
precisely this peaceful and just way of life had irritate some of his fellow citizen, 
namely those who did not live honest lives themselves. This kind of peoples, so 
continues the warning of Isocrates' friend, are more annoyed with the innocent than with 
the criminals, because the life of the innocent and of the honest man constitutes a 
parameter, in comparison to which their vices get highlighted (140-154). Isocrates 
moves on to argue against the charge that he was unfairly rich. In order to counter this 
charge, he compares his own wealth with the wealth of the richest of the sophists, 
Gorgias, following hereby the idea, that people of similar or of the same profession 
should compare with one another and not with the average in general. In this vein, 
continues Isocrates, if they class Isocrates' wealth with Gorgias', this would not be a 
complete mislead estimation and it would show that Isocrates expended more on his 
public duties than on his private life (155-158). 
As announced in the introduction we break here the commentary of the speech to 
expose next some traits of Pierre Hadot's approach to ancient philosophy as a way of 
life, which are of central importance for my purposes here. After that I go back to 
comment the second part of the Antidosis speech (158-323), which contains the most 
important passages for my reading of it. 
2. Some notes on Pierre Hadot's approach to the study ancient 
philosophy 
Pierre Hadot is counted among the most significant historians of philosophy to 
recover the vision of ancient philosophy as a way of life in the past century. His 
approach has broadly two branches: on the one hand he defends a mayor thesis about 
the essence of ancient philosophy, that is, a broad answer to the question “what is 
ancient philosophy?”, and on the other hand he developed an exegetical approach to 
interpret ancient philosophical texts. Both aspects are intimately interwoven in his 
oeuvre. For economy of language we are going to call the first aspect of Hadot's work 
the thematic-panoramic one and the second aspect the methodological one (cf. 
Fernandez 2012). 
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2.1 The thematic-panoramic aspect of Hadot's approach 
Hadot's mayor thesis in the thematic aspect of his oeuvre is that ancient philosophy 
throughout its history at least since Socrates is first and foremost a way of life. He 
claims furthermore that the aim of configuring the own life in a certain way and to live 
life guided by a certain ideal was a general and central trait shared by all philosophical 
schools and was moreover a trait present and central at the outburst of almost all 
philosophical production in antiquity. According to this one would be called a 
philosopher in antiquity if, and almost only if, he or she professed to conduct a certain 
way of life, namely the way of life specific to one of the known philosophical schools. 
In antiquity you could be perfectly considered a philosopher, with the full worthiness 
and dignity of such a title, regardless of the question whether you wrote philosophical 
texts or not. The developing of new philosophical theories, problems, ideas, or thoughts 
in the form of written texts was, unlike today's broad understanding of the term 
“philosopher”, no sine qua non condition to be regarded as a philosopher. One fine 
example of this difference between antiquity and today's conception of philosophy, 
which Pierre Hadot presents, is the roman emperor Marcus Aurelius, who, even though 
he did write philosophy, he did this only for himself (the meditations he wrote were 
unknown on his lifetime), and was considered philosopher mostly because of the way of 
life he professed to conduct. It wasn't back then a sufficient condition, on the other 
hand, to write about philosophy to be considered a philosopher. In that regard we have 
the opposite example (opposite to the case of Marcus Aurelius) of Aulus Gellius, a 
roman writer, contemporary of the philosopher-emperor, who was indeed interested in 
philosophy and wrote about philosophy but who wasn't considered to be a philosopher, 
simply because he never professed to live a philosophical life (cf. Hadot 1992, 17). In 
addition, the choosing of one of the schools offered was according to Pierre Hadot an 
essential trait of the ones called philosophers: you wouldn't count as a philosopher if 
you did not pick a school for your own philosophical life conduct. 
According to this broad and shifted (shifted in relation to the predominant current 
understanding today in respect to ancient philosophy) understanding of ancient 
philosophy, the central element of all philosophical activity was the pursuit of a virtuous 
life, and all philosophical production was in its core a certain variety of a spiritual 
exercises conceived to serve the purpose of the virtuous life, or at least had as it 
intended purpose to serve to a certain spiritual practice. 
 
2.2 The methodological aspect of Pierre Hadot's approach 
With this idea we arrive to the second aspect of Hadot's work: the methodological 
one. With this image of ancient philosophy as a way of life and as the practice of 
spiritual exercises in the back of the head, Hadot proposes, one must always try to 
examine ancient philosophical texts, that is, one must regard the text under the light of 
the ancient representation of a certain life and pursue of it guided by the ideal proposed 
by the philosophical school, to which both the author and his addressee of the text 
belonged. There are three prescriptions for the interpreter of ancient philosophy, which 
condense the approach of Pierre Hadot, each concerning one of the following issues: 
first, the intention of the author, second, the genre of the work studied, and third, its 
context (I thank Arnold I. Davidson for this schematical rendering of Hadot's method. 
cf. Arnold I. Davidson 1-47, in Hadot 1995a) 
These aspects are to be understood as three prescriptions for the scholar confronting 
any philosophical text in antiquity. Thus, one must ask oneself, first, what is the 
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formative intention of the author of the text, that is, in which way is he intending with 
these ideas and sentences to contribute to the spiritual improvement and formation of 
his disciples (or of himself in some cases). Secondly, the scholar should ask himself, 
what was the literary genre to which the text pertained. According to Hadot the 
manifold of the genres was brought about by the vast plurality of contexts of oral 
teaching and practice of philosophy as well as the variety of the contexts of oral 
communication between master and disciple.6 Lastly, the third aspect, the context, is 
partly about the general conception of philosophy at the time (that's why this part of the 
method is especially close to the thematic-panoramic aspect of Hadot's oeuvre referred 
above), and specifically about the philosophical life out of which the oeuvre in question 
emerges. (Let us note marginally, that another aspect of the context, but one which is 
not important for our purposes here, is the phenomenon of contresens, which we can 
translate, following Arnold Davidson, as transposition, and which consisted in the 
mutations of meanings due to the transfer of concepts doctrines sentences and so forth 
from one tradition, from one context, from one school or from one epoch to another.) A 
further aspect of the context is constituted by the studies of the topoi, the study of the 
formulae, images and metaphors, which are forced upon the author, who sees himself 
compelled to use them, but who usually tends to give this imposed pattern a meaning 
and a function which serves his purposes, functions and meanings which were absent in 
their original formulations. As also a part of the studies of the topoi Hadot considers the 
study, and this is for central importance for his purposes, of the topics of meditation and 
self-control stretched in the practice of lived philosophy, like the topic of conceiving 
philosophical life as a preparation to death, famously taken up by Socrates in Plato's 
Phaedo (67d). Finally, the context includes also the rather sociological question of how 
was philosophy and philosophical life perceived by non-philosophers, which could 
include the study of the vision of philosophy from non-philosophical authors, like 
comedians speaking about philosophers (cf. Arnold I. Davidson 1-47, in Hadot 1995a). 
3. The Antidosis speech and Isocrates' conception of philosophy 
While looking at Isocrates's text closer I will focus mostly on the thematic-panoramic 
aspect of Hadot's approach, that is, the lived practice and the inner conception of 
philosophy. Hereby I claim that the Antidosis speech is not suitable to be interpreted 
under scope of Hadot's method. Nonetheless, I will argue that the speech in question 
represents a fine testimony to foster the thematic-panoramic aspect of Pierre Hadot's 
approach. In the section [4.] I will expose, among other things, my own thesis with 
regard to Isocrates conception of philosophy and rhetoric, namely that he conceived 
 
6 This aspect of Hadot's proposal regarding the literary genres is of especial concern for the critic Hadot 
stresses to the widespread approach which overlooks the question regarding the literary genres. Hadot 
says that the interpreters of ancient prose (especially philosophy) often carry out their work under the 
(most of the times erroneous) assumption, that the oeuvres studied are treatises of philosophy, that is, 
works destined to the public mainly proposing theories or problems of a certain kind, thought of as 
contribution to the shared and public enterprise of moving forward philosophical theory. This approach is 
problematic because it presupposes some methodological decisions, whose deliberation is in the most 
cases not even tackled beforehand as it should properly be. That means, that these decisions are taken the 
most of the times without being considered as such, as decisions, but being considered just as the natural 
and only way of carrying out the philosophical interpretation of works of ancient philosophy. This is 
firstly problematic since the literary genre called “philosophical treatise” didn’t came to be the 
predominant genre in philosophy until the modern era. In the Antiquity it wasn’t predominant at all. (cf. 
for instance Hadot 1995a, 269). 
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both rhetoric and philosophy as aspects of the same art, which consists in the proper 
taking care of central issues of life by means of the speech: while rhetoric focuses on the 
public issues by means of the public speech, philosophy focuses on the private or rather 
inner issues by means of the inner speech. 
3.1 Rendering of the second part of the content of the Antidosis speech 
(resuming where we left in section [1.]) 
Briefly after comparing his own wealth with Gorgias' (see above at the end of section 
[1.]), Isocrates goes into the subject of education, where he explains the central place it 
has for the polis. Just as the education is shaped, he claims, so will later become the 
polis. The elders are gradually but constantly handing down the dealings of the polis to 
the youth. And in order to do that, they have to bring them up so the youth becomes 
able to deal with such issues and to replace the older generation in this task. In order for 
education to fulfil that role in the handing over of the responsibilities of the polis to the 
youth, learning oratory was central. The issues of the polis were tackled first and 
foremost through the practice of public speeches (174).  
About philosophy, Isocrates describes it while making a comparison with the body 
and presenting thereby a twofold vision of man: man is according to that a being with 
two natures: the body and the soul. Whereas the body is to be trained by the discipline 
called gymnastic, the discipline which is in charge of the training of the soul is 
philosophy (180-185). Both gymnastic and philosophy are similar and complementary: 
both have similar teaching (didaskalíais) and training (gymnasíais) methods and other 
kinds of instructions (epimeleíais) are also similar in them both (“tais didaskaliais kai 
tais gymnasiais kai tais allais epimeleiais” (ταῖς διδασκαλίαις καὶ ταῖς γυμνασίαις καὶ 
ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐπιμελείαις) [183]. Think here of Socrates's famous formula of the care of 
the soul, epimeleía tes psyches (ἐπιμελεία τῆς ψυχῆς), Platon, Apology 30b. Epimeleía 
can be translated both as instruction (as we do here in Isocrates' passage) or as 'care' (as 
is usually done in the Socrates quote just referred to.) 
The philosopher is furthermore compared with a sport teacher in the Antidosis speech 
(183). Just like it happens in gymnastics, the theories (ai dóxai, αἱ δόξαι) in philosophy 
are nothing more than the instructions or explanations which are given to the disciple at 
the beginning of his training, and whose purpose consists mainly of assisting the 
exercise and the use (184). The sport teacher and the philosopher contribute, 
respectively, to the bodily constitution and to the intellectual capacity of the disciple. 
But no teacher and no master of philosophy can grant to make a full-fledged athlete or a 
full-fledged speaker of his pupil. There is neither a science nor a method which could 
grant this with complete certainty (185). 
The necessary conditions for the rhetoric education, continues Isocrates, are the 
following: innate aptitude, experience and formal training. Aptitude is the most 
important of them three (187-191). This point could be problematic if we take rhetoric 
as being a synonym with philosophy (what Isocrates sometimes tends to do): If only the 
especially talented one are able to receive a philosophical education, that would mean 
that philosophy (i.e. the training and education of the soul) would not be meant for 
everyone, but only for a reduced elite of exceptionally talented young men and women. 
Nonetheless, in a latter passage (209-214), Isocrates develop an argument for the idea 
that even the those who lack innate aptitude can gain from the education of the soul just 
like even the ones who are bodily weak can gain strength thanks to gymnastics. In this 
passage Isocrates refute those who criticize philosophy when they claim that the 
intellect cannot be made better through training. He stresses the paradox of both 
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thinking, on the one hand, that gymnastic can improve even the innately worst disposed 
(which is easily agreed upon by virtually everyone), but thinking at the same time, on 
the other hand, that the souls are not susceptible to be turned substantially better through 
education and proper care.  
In the passage from 253 to 257 Isocrates develops a vision of man as a speaking 
being (homo loquens conception of man). According to him, that which distinguishes 
humans from other animals, is the faculty to convince (persuade) one another and to 
share to one another our wishes. This trait made us able to found poleis, to give 
ourselves laws, to create arts and crafts, and generally speaking “our ability to speak 
(memechaneména lógos, μεμηχανημένα λόγος) has helped us at almost all our creations 
and enterprises” (254). 
In 271 Isocrates presents the thesis that there is no science about what is to be said or 
about what is to be done. Isocrates, thus, considers “that man to be wise who is able by 
his powers of conjecture to arrive generally at the best course, and I hold that man to be 
a philosopher who occupies himself with the studies from which he will most quickly 
gain that kind of insight”. Thus, a philosopher will be nothing more than that man who 
pursues a certain virtue or excellence, the virtue of having the insight of what is to be 
done. 
There is furthermore no science which can warrant to turn an evil man into a good 
one. But the oratory, the art of speaking, can make the pupil to a morally better man by 
inculcating in him the striving for honor. He who has a good reputation, alone because 
of this trait, convinces his audience more than the one who doesn't. That sole reason 
would turn the life of a man who seriously goes after a career as a speaker into a 
righteous man, because if you want to be respected and honored, you should behave 
accordingly (note that we are here dealing with a prudential [i. e. not moral] foundation 
of the pursuit of virtues, or even a nonmoral foundation of morality, cf. 273-280). He 
then criticizes those who claim those to be philosophizing who love the strange theories 
of the ancient sophists but disregard to apply the verb (i. e. the verb “to philosophize”) 
to those who take good care of the practical issues, both private and public. Note by the 
way that this criticism of Isocrates of the understanding of philosophy by some of his 
contemporaries can also be seen as a criticism avant la lettre against our general and 
most widespread reception of Isocrates, according to which he is not a philosopher but 
merely a rhetorician. This arguably unfair reception of Isocrates can be explained as a 
reception embedded in the conventional view on ancient philosophy as mere theory 
which Pierre Hadot lucidly criticized, about which we talked about above (see note 4). 
4. Commentary of the referred passages in [3.] under the scope 
of Hadot's approach. 
The speech of Isocrates is clearly not much susceptible to be studied under Hadot's 
prescriptions. The three prescriptions of Pierre Hadot are thought of as a tool case for 
those works which are to be considered first and foremost as the written register of a 
certain philosophical spiritual practice, mostly an oral one. Works like Plato's Socrates' 
Apology or Isocrates' Antidosis are biographical writings, and as such, they above all 
give an account of the life and deeds of the philosopher in question, they refer indirectly 
(as every biographical account would do) to the philosophical life of the philosopher, 
and don't consist themselves in the written register of philosophical exercise in action 
(leaving aside the argumentation found in the text itself, which can after all be 
considered as de written register of the argumentation which was part of the 
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philosophical life of the philosopher in question). Thus, Hadot's metaphor of the 
philosophical text of the antiquity as being like a CD (cf. Arnold I. Davidson 19, in 
Hadot 1995a), that is, a recording which connects experiences, one lived in the past and 
one to be lived in the future, would not apply, or would do so only vaguely or indirectly, 
to works of the vein of Isocrates' Antidosis or of Plato's Apology of Socrates. In that 
sense, even though little susceptible of being studied under the scope of the three 
methodological prescriptions of Pierre Hadot, as we said, the speech Antidosis 
contributes as a testimony finely to foster the thematical-panoramic aspect of Pierre 
Hadot's approach, that is the image of ancient lived philosophy. It wouldn't be much 
fruitful to fully apply Hadot's method (i.e. to apply it to the letter) to the interpretation 
of this work. The reason is that the plain and literal application of his method 
presupposes (assumes) that the work studied is to be considered first and foremost as a 
spiritual exercise. Of course, no text is ever in itself a spiritual exercise, but it is rather a 
set of symbols pertaining to a symbol system (a language), which properly decoded 
purveys ideas, concepts, representations (images), notions and stories. With that being 
said, let us remember that according to Hadot that which is at stake at most 
philosophical activity in antiquity (and philosophical writings of antiquity are for Hadot 
almost always the written register of oral communication) is the practice of spiritual 
exercises, that is, a certain training in order to pursue an inner transformation and 
perfectionating inspired by an ideal notion of the wise man. The appliance of the 
method fails in this concrete example because the text in question is noticeably not in 
itself an example of a lived philosophical practice recorded in text (as some of Plato's 
dialogues do can be regarded as de written recording of the spiritual practice of the 
spoken dialogue). It is rather an account of the work of Isocrates done by himself which 
is motivated by his impression of being misunderstood and misjudged by his fellow 
citizens of Athens. Furthermore, it is as we said most likely a fictional defense speech of 
a trial which never took place (at most is loosely inspired, as we mention above, by a 
real trierarchy trial which took place in 357 BC, in which Isocrates, as he lost the trial 
had to pay the extraordinary tax (liturgy) consisted in the cost of a trireme). As such a 
fictional apology the Antidosis is nevertheless a fine testimony for the understanding of 
philosophy in the classical era, the Greece of Athens of the fifth and fourth century B.C. 
Another contribution to Hadot's approach in the example of Isocrates was made by 
Ilsetraut Hadot, the wife of Pierre Hadot, who, on her German PhD Thesis about Seneca 
and the Greek and Roman tradition of soul guidance (1967, of which a new French 
edition has recently appeared under the name of Direction spirituelle und pratique de la 
philosophie) examined the elements of this tradition among others in Isocrates. She 
compared the ideas about the parenetic speech in both Seneca and Isocrates. She quotes 
two letters of Isocrates, the letters to Nicocles and to Demonicos, in which Isocrates 
claims that, whereas virtue is the biggest and most durable possession, so is a good 
adviser the most valuable of all assets, for he leads one to the virtue (Isocrates I, 5 and 
II, 5, quoted at Hadot, I., Seneca und die griechisch-römische Tradition der 
Seelenleitung 13). 
I now will propose a central thesis regarding the interpretation of the text Antidosis 
itself. This suggestion is of main relevance with regard to the predominant conception 
of philosophy in the Athens of the classical period. We saw that, according to Isocrates, 
the way in which public issues of the polis were tackled was by means of public 
speeches. That is why the education in oratory was a key factor in order for the gradual 
handing over of the issues of the polis from the elders to the young to succeed. The 
issues of the polis were handled then by the rhetoricians in the forensic or public 
Fernández: Philosophy as a Way of Life in Isocrates’ School 
Documentos Core Curriculum                                                                                                     32 
 
speeches.7 We also saw, that in concordance to Isocrates' twofold conception of man as 
made out of both a body and a soul, whereby the two of which were to be trained, the 
first by gymnastic the second by philosophy and oratory. Furthermore, we saw that the 
training of the soul through philosophy was primarily and almost exclusively the 
education of the art of speaking. Accordingly the suggestion presented here by me 
would entail to ascribe to Isocrates the equating of rhetoric (ἡ ῥητορική τέχνη) and 
philosophy. According to this the two would be synonyms, and each of the two terms 
would at most connote different nuances of the same art. These nuances would then 
consist in the ambits, in which the art is applied: rhetoric would be thus the art of taking 
good care of the public issues, while philosophy would be the art of taking good care of 
the private (or shall we say inner?) issues also by means of the education of the art of 
the speech (in this second case not forensic, that is public, speech, but private, and even 
inner speech). 
This distinction which we are tended to do while reading the Antidosis speech 
between the private (or inner) sphere and the public or polis-related sphere, remind us of 
a distinction drawn by Hannah Arendt in her book The Human Condition. While 
enquiring about the public sphere in the classical Greek world and making a contrast 
with the modern world, Arendt said that the Greek (especially in Athens) of the classical 
period distinguished between the spheres of the koinós and the sphere of the oikós. The 
later corresponded to the issues of the household, in which, especially those kind of 
tasks regarding life sustain, like the providing of food for the house. From there it 
derived the modern term for economy, the science of the better arranging the providing 
of life sustain, word which knowingly comes from the Greek word oikonomía, which 
originally meant the science of administering the household. Arendt emphasizes in her 
book that this science was back then restricted to the private sphere: the problem of the 
material sustain of life was according to this in ancient Greece mainly a problem 
pertaining to the private sphere. The sphere of the koinós on the contrary was the sphere 
of the public, whose issues, unlike nowadays,  did not have to do mainly (if at all) with 
economy, but rather with some kind of human deeds, which Arendt render as action, 
which goes beyond the other two kinds of human activity distinguished by her in The 
human condition: labor (i. e. the providing for life sustain) and work (i. e. the 
production of the artifacts with which we live). Both of these kinds of lower activities 
pertain according to Arendt to the private sphere of the oikós. Action of the contrary, 
claims Arendt, did not have to do with any kind of work whatsoever. And this third kind 
of activity was mainly carried out in the classical democratic Athens by means of 
partaking in the public life of the citizens. The citizens who constituted the group of free 
rulers of the polis had to be free to do so, and in that sphere, it was the fully unfolding 
of their freedom that it was at stake. The disputing Athenians in the Agora were peers, 
nonetheless they were not much fulfilling an impersonal duty of administrating the 
polis, they were rather contesting and dialoguing about what the polis, which entailed 
that, in those discussions, the question about who and what they as individuals and as 
people were, was at stake. That is why the endeavor of the politicians to outstand by 
means of their unique traits were so crucial among the Athenians, for they were not only 
competing about the best way to administer a political entity, whose essence was 
 
7 We can attest a similar practice later in the late Roman Republic, as Cicero, as instructed by his father,  
and being still under-age was introduced in the jurist profession by means of frequenting the house of 
Quintus Mucius Scaevola Augur to attend to the issuing of legal opinion of the old Jurist as he was still 
under-age. (cf. Fuhrmann 23.) 
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already set and fixed, but rather, by their act of public speaking, they were defining the 
essence of that community itself (cf. Arendt, 37-96). 
Now, just to draw a first comparison between our reading of the Antidosis, and the 
koinós/oikós distinction proposed by Arendt, it seems quite plausible to equate the 
public issues referred by Isocrates with the koinós talked about by Arendt. That is, it 
seems on the one hand plausible to identify the master of rhetoric with the master of the 
political art. But, on the other hand, the identification of philosophy (as my reading of 
Isocrates proposes, defined as the taking care of private issues by means of the art of 
speech) and the oikonomía (the providing of the house) does not seem suitable at all. 
Nevertheless, Arendt's thematization of the Greek koinós can be helpful here if we take 
from it the idea that the highest element of the one's own life was at stake and been 
displayed while debating the public issues by means of speeches and conversation on 
the fore. If we accept this hypothesis, we might also think Isocrates is somehow 
proposing that rhetoric should be considered as a role model for philosophy: he would 
be proposing philosophy to be the responsible of taking care of issues which are at least 
just as important as those of the polis, namely, the issues of the soul, and by the same 
means, by which the issues of the polis were tackled: the cultivating and developing of 
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